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THE ODDS AGAINST TEACHING CONFLICTS
Gene R. Shreve
T HE kind invitation of Professor William Richman and the editors of The
University of Toledo Law Review to participate in this symposium enables
me to continue speculations on conflicts teaching that I began a few years ago.
In an essay celebrating the publication of Professor Richman's fine casebook,' I
noted some of the pleasures and frustrations of conflicts teaching. Among the
latter, I discussed how conflicts professors must compete with a variety of
distractions in the lives of second- and third-year students, and how these students
frequently exhibit cynical or even hostile attitudes toward conflicts law 2 The
conclusions of that essay rested on the sanguine assumption that, insofar as special
problems arose in conflicts teaching,3 professors could resolve them through
humanistic rededication, pedagogical retrenchment, and the selection of good
* Richard S. Melvin Professor of Law, Indiana University-Bloomington. This comment is a
revised version of an address given by the author at the Conflict of Laws session of the Association
of American Law Schools Conflicts Panel in January, 1996.
1. See Gene R. Shreve, Teaching Conflicts, Improving the Odds, 90 MICH. L. REv 1672 (1992)
(reviewing DAVID H. VERNON, LOUISE WEINBERG, WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS & WILLIAM M. RICHMAN,
CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS (1990)).
2. A conflicts course may treat a variety of topics including personal jurisdiction, the Erie
doctrine, and the intersystem recognition and enforcement of judgments. However, I mean by
conflicts law the choice-of-law process:
The purpose of conflicts law is to provide an intelligible and principled basis for choosing a
substantive rule (perhaps tort or contract) over the competing rule of another place. Rules
compete when their application would lead to conflicting results and when the relation of each
place to the controversy is such that it is plausible for the rule of either place to govern.
Conflicts law must legitimate the choice. It must explain why rejection of one law in favor of
another is right.
Gene R. Shreve, Conflicts Law-State or Federal? 68 IND. L.J. 907, 907 (1993). This article uses the
term "conflicts law" interchangeably with "conflict of laws" and "choice of law." On the origins of
"conflict of laws," see Donald T Trautman, The Relation Between American Choice of Law and
Federal Common Law, LAW & CONTEMI' PROBS., Spring 1977, at 105, 105 n.2. On "choice of law,"
see David F Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem. 47 HARV L. REV 173, 179 (1933).
3. My impressions about these problems come from twenty years of conflicts teaching, from
informal discussions with my students, and from discussions with other conflicts teachers. This
information is anecdotal. Assumptions about conflicts teaching and, particularly, about student
attitudes toward the conflict of laws could be tested through empirical research, but I am unaware of
any such study
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teaching materials.' This, I suggested, would enable more students to learn and be
stimulated by conflicts law '
Among the explanations why some students come to judge conflicts law harshly,
there was one that I did not really examine in the first essay That was the
possibility that those students are right. Is a dim view of conflicts law warranted?
Those of us who have developed a fondness for the subject would probably like to
answer "no." Yet we are aware of the sentiments of lawyers,6 judges,7 or
commentatorss toward conflicts law that prevent us from giving that answer with
great confidence. My article treats this rather disturbing side of our subject and
how it affects us as conflicts teachers.
I exclude from this study the delightful conflicts students who seem to like the
subject from beginning to end. I also exclude students who never seem to give
4. I applied to conflicts certain optimistic views about students and law teaching that I have
been developing over the years. See, e.g., Gene R. Shreve, Two Cheers for the Case Method, 30
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 601 (1985) (symposium on American legal education); Gene R. Shreve, History
of Legal Education, 97 HARV L. REV 597 (1983) (review essay); Gene R. Shreve, Bringing the
Educational Reforms of the Cramton Report into the Case-Method Classroom: Two Models, 59
WASH. U. L.Q. 793 (1981); Gene R. Shreve, Classroom Litigation in the First Semester of Law School,
29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 95 (1977); Gene R. Shreve, Law Intellect and Education by Francis A. Allen, 33
VAND. L. REV 822 (1980) (book review); Gene R. Shreve, Lawyers, Law Students and People by
Thomas L. Shaffer and Robert S. Redmount, 52 S. CAL. L. REV 259 (1978) (book review).
5. I wrote that conflicts law is:
One of the few common law courses in the upper curriculum, it invites more attention to themes
of judicial lawmaking and process than courses after the first year usually do. Moreover, the
topics addressed in conflicts are as challenging intellectually as a law teacher could want. They
continually provide opportunities to question the "what" and "why" of law. Finally professors
have a hook to use in teaching conflicts that is not always available in highly conceptual courses.
Conflicts problems inescapable in practice are really no different from those in the classroom.
In perhaps no other law school course do spheres of intellectualism (dear to the legal academy)
and practical understanding (dear to lawyers and judges) so overlap.
Shreve, supra note I, at 1672.
6. My impressions from talking to attorneys correspond with those of Professor Joseph W
Singer, who reported: "Many lawyers regard modern choice-of-law analysis as a confusing morass."
Joseph W Singer, A Pragmatic Guide to Conflicts, 70 B.U. L. REV 731, 731 (1990).
7 I have often found judges, whether speaking publicly or in iformal conversation, to be either
wary of conflict of laws or downright disapproving. This shows through in judicial opinions
occasionally See, e.g., In re Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 399 F Supp. 732, 739 (C.D. Cal. 1975)
(describing conflicts law as a "veritable jungle, which, if law can be found out, leads not to a 'rule of
action but a reign of chaos"); Paul v National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550, 553 (W Va. 1986) (describing
conflicts law as "cumbersome and unwieldy [creating] confusion, uncertainty and inconsistency, as
well as complication of the judicial task").
8. I wonder if any other body of American law receives such thorough and frequent disapproval
from scholars who write about it. See, e.g., Dirk H. Bliesener, Fairness and Choice of Law: A
Critique of the Political Rights-Bases Approach to Conflict of Laws, 42 AM. J. CoMP L. 687, 707-09
(1994); Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of Law
Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 1 (1991); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States:
The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV 249, 250 (1992); William A.
Reppy, Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash? 34 MERCER L. REV. 645, 646
(1983); Singer, supra note 6, at 731; Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law
Theory. 142 U. PA. L. REV 949, 951 (1994).
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conflict of laws a chance. My focus is on a third, swing group. These students start
the course with an open mind, and they invest a reasonable amount of energy in
preparing for class and trying to learn the subject. However, they eventually seem
to lose faith in the capacity of courts, commentators, or their professors to make
sense out of conflicts-to explain it as logical, principled, or coherent law 9
Students often enter conflicts class with an initial assumption about conflicts law
They probably share it with the community at large. The assumption is that courts
simply apply their own law To those untrained in conflicts law and analysis, the
stark unilateralism'0 of this assumption is a straightforward, intelligible, and
perfectly sensible. It in fact describes the conflicts law of ages past." Yet conflicts
professors quickly and easily demolish this assumption. We demonstrate the
injustice of forum shopping, the substantive chaos, and the pernicious acts of
judicial localism that would result from such law
Once we have destroyed their first assumption, students shift quickly and
intuitively to a second: that every jurisdiction does (or at least should) administer
the same conflicts law to reach the same choice-of-law result in a given case. For
those without significant exposure to conflicts law, the pure multilateralism'2 of this
assumption can seem a simple, straightforward, and attractive idea.'3 It comes
fairly close to describing what conflicts law in this country used to be. 4
It takes a bit longer in the course for the second assumption to collapse. The
multilateralist sympathies of some professors may in fact lead them to leave part
of the edifice of this assumption standing. However, at least by the time in the
course when the students consider choice of law and the Constitution, 5 it is quite
9. See Shreve, supra note 1. at 907 (explaining these necessary attributes of conflicts law).
10. In a unilateral approach, the sovereign jurisdiction entertaining the particular case may
sacrifice the translunsdictional goals of comity, reciprocity, and uniformity in order to recognize local
interests and advance them by the decision. The rule stated in the text accompanying this note
represents an extreme, unalloyed form of unilateralism probably unknown in this country. For further
discussion of the unilateral approach to choice of law and a brief history of unilateralism in the United
States, see Gene R. Shreve, Choice of Law and the Forgiving Constitution, 71 IND. L.J. 271, 284-86
(1996).
11. The principle operated generally until around 1200. See Peter Hay. Flexibility Versus
Predictability and Uniformity in Choice of Law, 226 RECUEIL DES CouRs 281, 293 (1991). However,
it lasted until the eighteenth century in the English courts. P.M. NORTH & J.J. FAWCETT, CHESHIRE
AND NORTH'S PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 23 (12th ed. 1992). See Shreve, supra note 10, at 282-84
(discussing the idea and history of multilateralism).
12. Multilateralism stands in opposition to unilateralism. Multilateralism venerates uniformity
of choice-of-law result for a given case wherever (within a community of sovereign jurisdictions) the
case happens to be entertained. Uniformity of result secures multilateralist goals of stability
reciprocity and comity.
13. See ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRAUTMAN, TiE LAW OF MULTISTATE
PROBLEMS: CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 299-300 (1965) ("[l]n general, like
motherhood, everyone favors uniformity of result ").
14. The rule stated in the text roughly conforms to conflicts law in this country until about the
middle of this century See Shreve, supra note 10, at 282-84 (discussing the multilateral approach to
choice of law and a brief history of multilateralism in the United States).
15. I have written that:
The Full Faith and Credit, Due Process, Equal Protection, Privileges and Immunities, and
Commerce Clauses all can easily be read to protect nonforum state interests, or the interest of
Spring 1996]
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clear that pure or even substantial multilateralism in American choice of law is an
illusion.
At about this time in the course, I think many students start seriously to doubt the
possibility of principled, coherent conflicts law They cannot find a third
successive assumption. They find instead contradiction and dissonance within
courts and the scholarly community about what conflicts law is or ought to be. It
is difficult to overstate how little stout building material is available for the
construction of a third assumption. Significantly, Professor Friedrich K. Juenger
opened his path-breaking history and critique of conflicts.law with the observation:
"The outstanding characteristic of the conflict of laws is the astonishing lack of
consensus on the discipline's goals and methods."'
' 6
A glance at the two choice-of-law approaches in extensive use that are considered
most up-to-date-the American Law Institute's Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws'7 and Professor Robert A. Leflar's Choice Influencing Considerations"-
gives some indication of the disarray and stasis of conflicts law and the disapproval
it inspires among commentators.
Published in 1971, the Restatement (Second) was a forced marriage of old-guard
multilateralism with new-wave unilateralism. The resulting attempt to meld a rule
based, jurisdiction-selecting approach with a method-based, policy-sensitive
approach,' 9 was probably doomed to failure. The Restatement (Second) often seems
as a consequence to be schizoid in application, ° particularly in the difficult and
important areas of torts and contracts. Moreover, while sections throughout the
Restatement (Second) require chosen law to be from a place bearing a "significant
nonforum litigants, that are disrupted by parochial state conflicts decisions. Yet the Supreme
Court rarely intervenes under the Constitution to protect these interests.
Shreve, supra note 10, at 271. The absence of constitutional control in this area makes possible a good
deal of conflicts localism:
[S]tate and federal diversity cases favoring local substantive law when the forum state s relation
to the controversy is clearly less than that of the place providing conflicting law. [C]onflicts
localism unfairly damages nonforum litigants, exhibits disrespect to nonforum governments, and
undermines principles of order and uniformity in choice of law.
Id.
16. FRIEDRICH K. JUFNGFR, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 1 (1993) ("Uncertaintv
about the proper approach to multistate problems reigns supreme and the conceptual apparatus of the
approaches that have been proposed is as complex as it is unconvincing.").
17 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
18. See Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts of Law, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 267 (1966) (hereinafter Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations); Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts
Law: More on Choice Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. L. REv 1587 (1966) (hereinafter Leflar,
Conflicts Law).
19 For a balanced and lucid exposition of the analytical core of the Restatement (Second), see
Michael S. Finch, Choice-of-Law Problems in Florida Courts: A Retrospective on the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), 24 STETSON L. REv 653, 655-71 (1995).
20. See, e.g., JUENGER, supra note 16, at 105-06 ("The Second Restatement became a mixture
of discordant approaches.') Laycock, supra note 8, at 253 ("Trving to be all things to all people, it
produced mush.").
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relationship" to the case,21 the Restatement never makes very clear how the
significance of relationships is to be determined in particular cases.22
In number of adoptions, Leflar's Choice-Influencing Considerations trail the
Restatement (Second) by a margin of about four to one.23  Professor Leflar
developed his approach at the time work on the Restatement (Second) was in
progress.24 A judicial realist and conflicts modernist, he developed an approach free
of the ponderous length and quixotic rule paraphernalia of the Restatement
(Second) At the same time, the conflicts approach of Choice-Influencing
Considerations is so cursory and loose-textured that it is particularly open to
haphazard or result-oriented applications. 5 And critics have found the greatest flaw
in Leflar's approach to be that it authorizes choice based in part on the substantive-
law preferences of the judge.2 6 To many commentators, the authority of courts to
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. c ( 1971) ("All that can presently
be done in these areas is to state a general principle, such as application of the local law of the state
of most significant relationship, which provides some clue to the correct approach but does not
furnish precise answers.").
22. Many commentators have found this to be a serious fault. See, e.g., Brainerd Currie,
Comments on Babcock v Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv
1212, 1233 (1963); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law
of Torts-Law and Reason Versus the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP PROBS. 700, 700
(1963); Friedrich K. Juenger, Choice of Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 202, 212 (1969);
Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1990: Trends and Developments, 39 AM. J.
COMP L_ 465, 486-89 (1991); Joseph W Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REv 1, 77 (1989).
On the other hand, some commentators have offered positive (if somewhat guarded) assessments
of the Restatement (Second). See, e.g., Harold L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique,
83 COLUM. L. REv 772, 816-19 (1983); J.H.C. Morris, Law and Reason Triumphant, or How Not to
Review a Restatement, 21 AM. J. CoMi L. 322 (1973); Willis L. M. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the
Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP PROBS. 679, 692-99 (1963).
23. "[The Restatement Second is, to date, the dominant methodology within the modern camp,
being followed in twenty-two states." Symeon C. Symeonides, Exception Clauses in American
Conflicts Law, 42 AM J. COMP. L. 813, 825 (1994). Professor Patrick J. Borchers' recent survey listed
five states following Leflar's approach in torts cases. Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice of Law
Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 357 370-73 (1992). States that have
adopted neither the Restatement (Second) nor Leflar's Choice-Influencing Considerations use a variety
of different approaches. See id., Henna H. Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts,
34 MERCER L. REv 521, 579-84 (1982); Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1050-169 (1987); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American
Courts in 1993 (and in the Six Previous Years), 42 AM. J. COM L. 599, 606-12 (1994).
24. The methodology was presented and elaborated in two articles. Leflar, Choice-Influencing
Considerations, supra note 18, at 279-304; Leflar, Conflicts Law, supra note 18, at 1586-88.
25. Cf JUENGER, supra note 16, at 119-20 ("The conflicts practice in the minority of states that
follow Leflar's teachings has been even more consistently result-oriented [than those states following
the Restatement (Second)]. Since tort victims are likely to sue in a state whose substantive law
provides recovery, result-selectivity and forum preference tend to point in the same direction. Seldom
will a plaintiff sue in ajurisdiction whose rules of decision are unfavorable; and it is only in these rare
cases that courts must either sacrifice teleology to government interests or opt for result-selectivity at
the expense of local policies.").
26. This is Professor Leflar's consideration entitled, "Application of the Better Rule of Law,"
explained and defended at length in Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations, supra note 18, at 295-
304.
Spring 1996]
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choose law on this basis is very doubtful, and use of a "better rule" criterion skews
the conflicts decision.
Such is the Janus-faced picture of conflicts law that complicates conflicts
teaching. The subject-matter makes it both a wonderful and exasperating course to
teach." How do we cope with the second in order to maximize the first? How bad
are the odds against teaching conflicts? Regrettably this essay does more to frame
the question than to answer it.
One thing, however, does seem clear. We should try to avoid dealing with
student rejections of conflicts law in unproductive ways. First, we should not teach
the course in a way to conceal or marginalize the deep fissures that exist in
contemporary conflicts law and commentary Second, we should think twice before
suggesting to students that the problems afflicting conflicts law will disappear when
our pet theories (whatever they may be) are universally accepted. Third, we should
try not to give up on our students or the subject.
The largest single reason why conflicts law is in disarray may be that it is and
always will be an exceedingly difficult branch of law. One commentator has noted
that:
Those who work m the field of choice of law are, at times, discouraged by the
apparently intractable nature of the problems with which they must grapple. Intricate
and subtle analyses are undertaken; ambiguities and uncertainties are painfully
resolved. Ultimately, a result is reached, yet the solution is too frequently neither
entirely satisfying nor fully convincing. 9
The frustration some of our students may feel when they cannot construct a third
and lasting assumption about the content of conflicts law foretells the frustrations
of lawyers and judges who must live with the subject in practice. Perhaps we
succeed as conflicts teachers, I think, when we introduce students for the first time,
and in a thorough, balanced way to both to the richness and to the real difficulties
of the subject.
27 See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 104-05 (1963);
EUGENE F SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 30-31 (2d ed. 1992); Hans W Baade, The Case
of the Disinterested Two States: Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HorsTA L. REv 150, 166 (1973); William
F Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1. 4-6 (1963); David F Cavers,
Contemporary Conflicts Law in American Perspective, III RECUEI. DES COURS 75, 122-43 (1970);
Kom, supra note 22, at 958; Morris, supra note 22, at 324. Cf Louise Weinberg, Against Comity,
80 GEo. L.J. 53, 94 (1991) (doubting the present value of a substantive law criterion); P John Kozyns,
Postscript: Interest Analysis Facing Its Critics-And, Incidentally, What Should Be Done About
Choice of Lawfor Products Liability2 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 569, 571 (1985) (same).
In keeping with the tradition of spirited disagreement within conflicts academe, some
commentators approve of a role for substantive law preference in choice of law See, e.g., RUSSELL
J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 284 (3d ed. 1986); Friedrich K. Juenger,
Mass Disasters and the Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv 105, 125-27 Willis L. M. Reese,
Substantive Policies and Choice of Law, 2 TOURO L. REv 1, 1 (1986).
28. On the positive side, see Shreve, supra note 1, at 1672.
29 Arthur T. von Mehren, Chotce ofLaw and the Problem ofJustice, LAW & CONTEMP PROBS.,
Spring 1977 at 27, 27
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